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AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED PRIVATIZATION OF
CHICAGO'S MIDWAY AIRPORT
CASEY ANDREW BURTON*
A THOUGH IT IS now a given that the government will have
substantial influence over many of our daily activities, the
ownership and control of an airport do not necessarily have to
be almost entirely dominated by government. However, nearly
every commercial service airport in the United States is owned
and controlled by either the government or a governmental
agency.' The American method of ownership is not the only
viable option, as experiences in many other parts of the world
have shown that private ownership or operation of airports can
lead to very successful results.2
Attempting to get the United States on board with this world-
wide phenomenon, Chicago Mayor Richard Daley and his De-
partment of Aviation have applied to the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), seeking to participate in the Airport
Privatization Pilot Program, a trial privatization program. Chi-
cago filed its preliminary application4 and its application was ac-
* Casey Burton, J.D. Candidate 2008, SMU Dedman School of Law; B.A. 2005,
Miami University.
I Christopher R. Rowley, Financing Airport Capital Development: The Aviation In-
dustry's Greatest Challenge, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 605, 624 (1998).
2 See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED 97-3, AIRPORT PRIVATIZA-
TION: ISSUES RELATED TO THE SALE OR LEASE OF U.S. COMMERCIAL AIRPORTS 5
(1996) [hereinafter AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION] ("Specifically, privately owned air-
ports have generated large profits for their shareholders because of steady
growth in passenger traffic and concession revenue, despite government caps on
airline fees and the owner's investment in infrastructure.").
3 See CITY OF CHICAGO DEP'T OF AVIATION, PRELIMINARY APPLICATION UNDER 49
U.S.C. 47134 FOR PRIVATIZATION OF CHICAGO MIDWAY INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
§ 1, 1 (2006) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY APPLICATION].
4 Id.
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cepted;5 thus, Chicago Midway Airport is well on its way to
becoming the first major privatized airport in the United States.
The goal of this Comment is to first develop the history be-
hind both the American and global experiences with privatized
airports, to give the current progress of the Midway application
as well as the current law governing the continued privatization,
to outline the theoretical arguments supporting and opposing
airport privatization, and finally, to analyze the privatization as it
applies to Midway.
I. HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN AND GLOBAL EFFORTS
AT AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION
A. GLOBAL EXPERIENCES
The rest of the world is far ahead of the United States when it
comes to the privatization of airports.6 The airport privatization
movement started in 1986 when Margaret Thatcher, then Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom, pushed through the Parlia-
ment the Airports Act of 1986. 7 The Airports Act dissolved the
British Airport Authority, which was the government agency that
owned the seven largest British airports.8 After dissolving the
British Airport Authority, the government-owned company BAA
PLC was created in order to have a stock flotation; by selling
their shares in the new BAA, the British government was able to
receive £1.225 billion.9 A key component of the sale was the fact
that the government sold its seven airports as a single package
rather than breaking up the airports and selling them sepa-
rately.10 Most observers saw this packaging as an enormous
problem due to the potential creation of a monopoly over air-
ports in the United Kingdom (UK). 1 The British government
sold both the control rights to the airports, as well as the prop-
5 Letter from David L. Bennett, Director, FAA Office of Airport Safety and
Standards, to Dana Levenson, Chief Financial Officer, City of Chicago (Oct. 3,
2006), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf98/417979_web.pdf.
6 See AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 5.
7 Airports Act, 1986, c. 31 (Eng.).




10 JosR A. GOMEZ-IBANEZ &JOHN R. MEYER, GOING PRIVATE: THE INTERNATIONAL
EXPERIENCE WITH TRANSPORT PRIVATIZATION 215 (1993). The privatized airports
were London's Heathrow, Gatwick, and Stansted, and the four major Scottish
airports of Prestwick, Glasgow, Edinburgh, and Aberdeen. Id. at 212.
11 Id.
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erty on which the airports sat, although such a sale is the excep-
tion rather than the rule. 12 More airport privatizations have
occurred through lease rather than through sale, but the priva-
tization of the seven BAA airports has been by far the most suc-
cessful example of privatization, as BAA has increased the
number of flights and increased profits, all while completing
enormous improvements to the airports. 3
Several other governments have experimented with privatiza-
tion, mostly in Europe, but also in Australia, South America, In-
dia, and China. 4 The Australian privatization was accomplished
in a different method than the BAA privatization, as the Austra-
lian government privatized several airports, including the major
airports of Brisbane, Melbourne, and Perth, in a concession for
fifty years with an option for a further forty-nine years.' 5 This
privatization brought in $2.6 billion for the Australian govern-
ment, illustrating the degree of interest in private acquisitions of
airport infrastructure.' 6 Not only was the government a winner
in this transaction, but the private parties running the Austra-
lian airports were able to provide substantial cost savings across
the board, as they cut anywhere from five to twelve percent of
cost categories such as labor, utilities, administration, and main-
tenance, all by increasing the efficiency of the airports. 7 Fur-
ther, the Australian-type privatization, where the government
continues to own the land but leases it to a private company, is
seen as a good intermediate solution between a simple manage-
ment contract and the outright sale of the airport to private
interests. '
12 HANS-ARTHUR VOGEL, PRIVATISATION AND FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE OF EURO-
PEAN AIRPORTS 6 (2005), http://wip.tu-berlin.de/typo3/index.php?id=215 ("Air-
port privatization usually involves only the transfer of some ownership rights.").
13 Charles Sander, Unisys, Airport Privatization: Trends and Opportunities,
http://www.unisys.com/transportation/insights/white-papers/papers.htm?in-
sightslD=88345 (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
14 Zane 0. Gresham & Brian Busey, "Do As I Say and Not As I Do"-United States
Behind in Airport Privatization, 17 AiR & SPACE LAW. 12, 13 (2002).
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Sander, supra note 13.
is See ROBERT W. POOLE, JR., REASON FOUNDATION, How-To GUIDE No. 13,
GUIDELINES FOR AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION 2 (1994), available at http://www.reason.
org/htgl3.pdf.
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B. AMERICAN EXPERIENCES
Ownership and control of commercial airports in the United
States, especially for airside functions,19 has been almost exclu-
sively the domain of the public sector.20 Interest in the privatiza-
tion of American airports began after seeing the British results,
and the first American experience was the management con-
tract entered into between BAA and the Indianapolis Interna-
tional Airport; this 1995 agreement was one where BAA was paid
to run the day-to-day groundside operations of the airport over a
ten-year term, but the city of Indianapolis retained long term
planning control over the entire airport operation. 2' BAA
promised to save the city of Indianapolis at least $32 million-in
reality, it saved more than this amount and therefore was able to
make a profit.22 Following its success in Indianapolis, BAA and
other international infrastructure management firms entered
into additional arrangements at other American airports, such
as Pittsburgh, Harrisburg, Atlanta, and Orlando.23
However, these management contracts are not the same as
the privatization occurring in Europe. There, private compa-
nies are either leasing the airport over a long term period or
purchasing the airport outright, and therefore have incentives
to increase the capacity, productivity, and efficiency of the air-
port, including airside opportunities.2 4 In an effort to promote
either the sale or lease of commercial airports in the United
States, in 1996 Congress enacted the FAA Pilot program on pri-
vate ownership of airports ("Airport Privatization Pilot Program"
or "the pilot program").25 This program, which will be further
discussed, allows for five airports to either be sold or leased to a
private entity; thus, any government owner wishing to sell or
lease its airport may apply to the FAA under the statute, and if
found to have met certain requirements, may engage on a
course toward privatization.26
19 Airside functions are those that relate to runway use, gate decisions on us-
age, and other similar operations, as opposed to the groundside operations such
as airline ticket counters, restaurants, and janitorial services. See GOMEZ-IBANEZ &
MEYER, supra note 10, at 213.




24 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 2, 7-8.
25 Pub. L. No. 104-264, Title I, § 149(a)(1), 110 Stat. 3224 (codified as
amended at 49 U.S.C. § 47134 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004)).
26 Id.
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Given the excitement around the world about the privatiza-
tion of airports, one may think that the five slots in this pilot
program have already been taken; however, to date, only one
American airport has participated successfully in the program
and achieved privatization, namely Stewart International Airport
in Newburgh, New York.27 Stewart International Airport (Stew-
art) is currently being leased by National Express Group, an
American subsidiary of a UK-based transportation company of
the same name.28 In addition to Stewart's participation in the
pilot program, three other airports applied for the program but
later withdrew from consideration, and the application of New
Orleans' Lakefront Airport is still under review.29
Why so few airports have opted to privatize is a puzzling ques-
tion, and one that will be further explored, but airports are cer-
tainly not being scared off by failed results. The privatization of
Stewart has been nothing short of a success according to FAA
reports, meeting the goals of a successful airport privatization.3
Congress and the proponents of privatization had three goals in
enacting the privatization program: first, they hoped that the
infusion of private capital would lead to an increase in capacity;
second, they hoped that the private firm could lower operating
costs through increasing efficiency; and finally, they hoped that
privatization would increase customer satisfaction." According
to the FAA, the privatization of Stewart resulted in new sources
of capital for the airport, as evidenced by the reduced reliance
on both federal and state funding.32 Second, the FAA found
27 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 14; see also Stewart International Airport,
Stewart International Airport: A Journey in Flight, http://www.swfny.com/his-
tory.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
28 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 14.
29 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION & FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATUS OF THE AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION PILOT PRO-
GRAM 1 (2004), available at http://dmses.dot.gov/docimages/pdf92/334434_
web.pdf [hereinafter 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS].
30 Id. at 10.
31 Id.
32 Id. ("The private operator's planned capital investments [totaling $48.6 mil-
lion over five years] include . . . widening of a taxiway ($3.3 million), the con-
struction of administrative and maintenance facilities ($3 million), airfield
lighting controls ($2.5 million), perimeter road rehabilitation ($0.5 million), ex-
panded car parking ($1.5 million), and snow removal equipment ($1.1 million),"
of which $10.3 million, or over twenty percent of the capital investment budget,
will be paid by the private entity. Id. This is not just a substitution of expendi-
ture; rather, this is a ten percent increase over what the New York Department of
Transportation would have provided. Id. at 10-11.).
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that the private operators of Stewart decreased operating costs
and maintained an operating profit even during the post-Sep-
tember 11th decline in air traffic.33 Further, in surveys done by
the New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT), it
was reported that "the transfer of the airport to private control
has enhanced the performance and efficiency of SWF (Stewart's
airport code) by eliminating an entire level of approvals for
commercial use of the airport. 3 4 Finally, it was reported to NYS-
DOT that the private operator improved the airport's relation-
ship with the business community and aided in the
environmental cleanup of the area, showing the increased care
for customer service. 5
C. BACKGROUND HISTORY OF CHICAGO'S AIRPORTS AND
OTHER INFRASTRUCTURE
Chicago's Midway International Airport ("Midway" or "Mid-
way Airport") was the first great airport in the United States.
Built in 1924 as a private airstrip, it was acquired in 1927 by the
City of Chicago, and by 1929 was recognized as the busiest air-
port in the world.36 However, it soon became clear that Midway
was going to be too small to serve the burgeoning needs of a city
such as Chicago, and O'Hare International Airport (O'Hare)
was built to meet the needs of the local and connecting passen-
gers.3 7 O'Hare opened to general traffic in 1955, and in 1962 all
scheduled operations moved from Midway to O'Hare. 8 After
O'Hare became the dominant airport in Chicago, many airlines
left Midway, and the number of passengers flying through Mid-
way drastically diminished throughout the 1960s and 70s. 9
However, with deregulation of the airlines in 1978 and the sub-
sequent creation of smaller airlines, Midway went through a revi-
talization; in 1979 Midway Airlines started service, but the real
boost came in 1985 when Southwest Airlines began flying to and
from Midway.4 °
33 See id. at 11.
34 Id. at 12.
35 Id.
36 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 6, at 8.
37 Airwise.com, Chicago O'Hare Airport History, http://www.airwise.com/air-
ports/us/ORD/ORD_07.html (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
38 Id.; see also PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 6 at 8.
39 See Chicago O'Hare Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON), A His-
tory of Midway Airport, http://www.thetracon.com/MidwayHistory.htm (last vis-
ited Oct. 29, 2007).
40 Id. See also PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 6, at 8.
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Currently, Midway is in the process of reinventing itself. Dur-
ing the years of 1994-2004, Midway was the fastest growing air-
port among the fifty largest airports in the United States,
increasing its number of enplaned passengers by 128 percent. 41
Rising from a near death, Midway currently is the twenty-fourth
busiest airport in the United States, ranking just behind Wash-
ington's Dulles Airport, and ahead of airports such as Salt Lake
City, San Diego, and Washington's Reagan Airport.42
In addition to evidence of past growth, Midway remains an
excellent choice for privatization for a number of other reasons.
First, Midway Airport is the closest major airport to the enor-
mous population center that is downtown Chicago, and is conve-
niently accessible by both car and public transportation, as the
airport has a stop on Chicago's "L."' 43 Midway also has recently
redeveloped its terminals, creating newer facilities for conces-
sions, increased parking, and improved roadways. 44 Addition-
ally, Midway produces a steady revenue stream in excess of $120
million annually, of which over $90 million is operating revenue
alone.45 Finally, and most importantly, Midway has defined it-
self in the market as an airport catering to the origination and
departure (0 & D) passenger market, which means that it serves
less for connecting traffic and more for people starting and end-
ing their flights in Chicago.46 Midway has marketed itself as "the
premier point-to-point, or 0 & D airport, in the United States,
providing low-cost service to business and leisure travelers
throughout the region; '47 this means that it does not have to
compete as directly with O'Hare, as generally the customers will
have different preferences regarding price, service, and
convenience.
41 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, BUREAU OF TRANSPORTATION STATIS-
TICS, NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION STATISTICS, tbl. 1-41 (2007), available at http://
www.bts.gov/publications/national-transportationstatistics/html/table-01 41.
html [hereinafter PASSENGERS BOARDED].
42 Id.
43 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 6, at 7.
44 Id.
45 Id. § 6, at 12.
In 2005, Midway generated $92.2 million of operating revenue (ex-
cluding PFC and federal grant revenues), plus $22.3 million of net
PFC [passenger facility charge, a type of user fee that is charged in
order to receive money for specific federally approved capital
projects] revenue and $18.1 million of federal grants.
Id.
46 Id. § 6, at 5, 13.
47 Id. § 6, at 5.
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One further benefit of privatizing Midway, as opposed to any
other large commercial airport, is that the City of Chicago al-
ready has experience privatizing its transportation infrastruc-
ture. In January 2005, the City of Chicago closed on a ninety-
nine year lease with two foreign infrastructure finance firms, in
which the two firms paid over $1.8 billion for the lease rights to
the Chicago Skyway, a system of toll bridges connecting Chicago
and the Indiana Turnpike.48 Under this agreement, which was
the first privatization of an existing toll road in the United
States, the private owners are entitled to all of the revenue from
the tolls, but they are also responsible for the maintenance and
operation costs of the road.49 Because the City of Chicago has
already experienced a major infrastructure asset privatization,
the transaction costs of familiarizing the government with the
process will be eliminated, and the political support necessary
for a smooth transition will already be in place.
II. CURRENT STATUS OF PRIVATIZATION LAW AS
APPLIED TO CHICAGO'S MIDWAY AIRPORT
Prior to the 1996 implementation of the Airport Privatization
Pilot Program (the pilot program), airports were not allowed to
be sold or leased to private parties. 5' During that time, the only
American effort at privatization was the management contract
entered into between BAA and the Indianapolis Airport, which
was a much less comprehensive form of privatization. 51 Cur-
rently in the United States, the only legal way to sell or lease a
commercial service airport to a private owner is through the pi-
lot program. 5
2
A. BACKGROUND TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARPORT
PRIvATIZATION PROGRAM
Before discussing the current state of the law, one must first
know what prompted Congress to pass the law and what con-
cerns it was trying to address in creating the pilot program. As
mentioned previously, the rest of the world is far ahead of the
United States in the privatization of airports, and -the goal of the
48 See id. § 6, at 4. See also Skyway Concession Co., Chicago Skyway http://
www.chicagoskyway.org/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
49 Skyway Concession Co., Chicago Skyway, http://www.chicagoskyway.org/
(last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
50 See Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 14.
51 See id. See also POOLE, supra note 18, at 2-3.
52 See 49 U.S.C. § 47134(a) (2000).
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pilot program was to "determine if, once certain economic and
legal impediments were removed, airport privatization in the
United States could generate alternative sources of capital for
airport development and provide benefits such as improvements
in customer service. 53
The "economic and legal impediments" which concerned
Congress were varied and truly did present an enormous barrier
to the privatization of American airports. The foremost impedi-
ment to privatization was the federal law prohibiting an airport
operator from diverting revenue to non-airport purposes if they
receive or have received federal grants.54 This prohibition is im-
portant for one main reason: if the airport operator, which for
all commercial airports is a governmental entity, may not divert
revenue to non-airport purposes, then arguably the sale or lease
proceeds could be deemed revenue, and the public entity could
not use those proceeds for any other purposes.55 This effectively
doomed any attempted sale or lease, because no government
was willing to sell such a huge asset if they were not going to be
allowed to use the proceeds as they wished.56
Another issue facing potential privatization efforts was the
fear that after purchasing the airport, the private operator
would then be forced to reimburse the federal government for
any grants the airport accepted while it was a public entity. 57
Similarly, there was a question as to whether a private operator
would be able to continue using any land that the airport ac-
quired as surplus federal property, as the Secretary of Transpor-
tation would have to authorize any transfer of such property,
and therefore could block the transfer of such lands.58 With
these two issues, the problem was not that a certain law or proce-
dure was blocking the transfer, but rather that there was uncer-
tainty in the legal regime. Therefore a private entity could not
know the correct price to pay for an airport and the government
owner would not know at what price to sell the airport.59
There were also several economic factors that placed con-
straints on privatization. The first and most important con-
5 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 29, at 2.
54 49 U.S.C. § 47107(b)(1) (2000). See also AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note
2, at 36.
55 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 37.
56 See id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 38.
51) Id.
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straint was that private airports, which as public entities were
eligible to issue tax-exempt bonds, would not have tax-exempt
status.60 It was predicted that this would increase the interest
rate on financing by about two percent, which could have a sig-
nificant impact on whether capital improvement projects are
undertaken.6 1 Another economic factor was that private air-
ports would lose access to some federal grant money-private
airports would no longer be eligible for Airport Improvement
Program (AIP) apportionment grants, but still could receive the
discretionary grants provided by AIP.62 The final economic hur-
dle was that a fully privatized airport could no longer collect
Passenger Facility Charges (PFCs),63 which are fees that airports
can collect to offset capital costs for FAA-approved projects.64
However, this is not much of a problem because a privately
leased airport may still be able to collect PFCs with the aid of the
government entity from which they are leasing; however, if for
some reason they were no longer able to collect PFCs, they
could charge passenger usage fees that would replace and po-
tentially exceed any lost revenue from the inability to collect
PFCs.65
B. THE STRUCTURE OF THE PILOT PROGRAM
Given these concerns and coupled with a true desire to make
privatization of airports in the United States feasible, Congress
set out to provide incentives for airports to privatize by enacting
the pilot program. The general scheme of the pilot program is
that it exempts a few trial airports from some of the federal laws
that hindered airport privatization, and changes some economic
incentives.66 Most importantly, the lessor or seller may be ex-
60 Id. at 41.
61 Id. It may be possible for the lessee of the airport to issue tax-exempt bonds,
as the government entity that has possession of the property will issue the bonds
in its name on behalf of the lessee earmarked for debt service. POOLE, supra note
18, at 15.
62 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 41. This is not as burdensome a
constraint for larger, more successful airports like Midway, as the majority of
their funding comes from operating revenues, Passenger Facility Charges, and
renting space inside the airport. See PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, at
12.
63 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 41.
64 Fed. Aviation Admin., Passenger Facility Charge (PFC), http://www.faa.
gov/airports-airtraffic/airports/pfc/ (last visited Oct. 29, 2007).
65 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 41.
66 49 U.S.C. § 47134 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra
note 29, at 2.
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empted from "all or part of the requirements to: use airport rev-
enues for airport related purposes; pay back a portion of
Federal grants upon the sale of an airport; [and] return airport
property deeded by the Federal Government upon transfer of
the airport. '67 Further, the purchaser or lessee can be ex-
empted from "the requirement to use all airport revenues for
airport purposes to the extent necessary to permit the purchaser
or lessee to earn compensation from the operations of the
airport."68
As the sole method for a commercial airport to engage in ei-
ther a sale or long-term lease, the details of the pilot program
are crucial in establishing incentives for airports to engage in
these new methods of capital acquisition. It must first be noted
that only five airports are permitted to participate in the pilot
program, and only one of the participating airports can be a
large hub airport.69 Thus, if Midway successfully completes its
application and becomes privatized, it will be the only large hub
airport allowed to participate in the pilot program, thus provid-
ing a first mover advantage to the company willing to lease the
airport.70 Another restriction of the pilot program is that a com-
mercial service airport can only be leased, while a general avia-
tion airport can either be either sold or leased. 71 Thus, while
the City of Chicago can only lease Midway to a private firm, the
restriction has little practical effect, as a ninety-nine-year lease
has very little financial impact on the transaction-under a long-
term lease, the lessee is still responsible for paying for capital
improvements and will receive the benefits as if it were the
owner, where the only difference would come towards the end
of the lease term. 2
Following a decision to lease an airport, the government en-
tity must go through a two-step application process involving a
67 49 U.S.C. § 47134(b) (1)-(3); 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 29, at 2.
68 49 U.S.C. § 47134(b) (1)-(3); 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 29, at 2.
69 49 U.S.C. § 47134(b), (d) (2) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004). A "large hub airport"
is defined as "an airport that had 1 percent or more of the total passenger board-
ings (as defined by § 47102) in the United States in the preceding calendar year."
Id. Thus, although not traditionally thought of as a hub in common parlance
because it is primarily focused on 0 & D passengers, for the purpose of the pilot
program, grants and funding, and other airport classifications Midway is statuto-
rily defined as a large hub airport. 49 U.S.C. § 47102(10) (Supp. IV 2004).
70 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 6, at 5.
71 49 U.S.C. § 47134(a) (2000).
72 POOLE, supra note 18, at 3.
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preliminary application and a more in-depth final application.73
The preliminary application includes the objectives of privatiza-
tion, a timetable for the process, a description of the property,
financial statements, and a copy of the request for proposals that
the government will use in finding a private entity to lease the
airport. The FAA then looks over the preliminary application,
and generally either accepts the application within a month of
the filing or rejects the proposal and sends it back for additional
information.7 5 In the case of Midway, the City of Chicago's pre-
liminary application was filed on September 15, 2006, and on
October 3, 2006, Chicago received notice that their preliminary
application met all of the procedural requirements. 76 The final
application is considerably more in-depth, and allows the FAA to
decide whether the airport is an acceptable candidate under the
pilot program. To make this decision, the FAA requires the fi-
nal application to include eight parts, including: the terms of
the transfer, the qualifications of the private operator, the ex-
emptions requested by both the government and the operator, a
certification that sixty-five percent of the air carriers have ap-
proved the exemption allowing the use of airport revenue for
general purposes, and a description of how the airport will be
operated, maintained, and developed after the transfer.77
Upon receiving the final application, the FAA will review it to
see if the proposal meets all nine of the requirements found in
§ 47134.78 These requirements are: the airport will continue to
be available for public use; the operation of the airport will not
be interrupted by insolvency or bankruptcy; the purchaser or
lessee will maintain, improve, and modernize the airport; every
fee imposed on an air carrier will not increase faster than infla-
tion unless approved by sixty-five percent of the air carriers;
safety and security will be maintained at the highest possible
levels; noise and other environmental concerns must be miti-
gated to the same extent as at a public airport; and any collec-
tive bargaining agreement will not be abrogated by the sale or
73 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 29, at 3.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Letter from David L. Bennett to Dana Levenson, supra note 5.
77 Airport Privatization Pilot Program: Application Procedures, 62 Fed. Reg.
48,693, 48,706-08 (Sept. 16, 1997).
78 49 U.S.C. § 47134(c) (2000); see also 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note
29, at 5.
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lease.7 9 Of these requirements, clearly the two most critical are
that the private operator will maintain, improve and modernize
the airport, and that each fee imposed on an air carrier will not
increase faster than inflation." The former requirement is criti-
cal because there are no inexpensive capital projects when it
comes to financing an airport improvement project, especially
for an airport the size of Midway, and therefore the burden of
maintaining and improving the airport could turn out to be ex-
tremely heavy. This requirement, combined with the fact that
fees cannot rise faster than inflation, could spell a death toll for
a private operator, as the rising costs of capital projects will not
be offset by increasing fees faster than inflation.
If the application is approved, any agreement between the
government and private operator can be finalized, and the
privatization can take place. Chicago is currently in the stage of
garnering the support of the airlines that have service through
the airport, as well as finding an operator that will accept a lease
with the city, although sources say that several of the biggest
names in infrastructure investment are looking to make bids on
Midway."' Chicago's current goal is to come to an agreement in
principle with one of the private operators, receive final FAA
approval, and close the privatization of Midway during the sec-
ond half of 2007.82
The main features of the pilot program are the exemptions
mentioned above. These exemptions were added in order to
allay concerns of governments, private operators, and the air
carriers.83 The first and most important exemption that can be
granted is that the FAA may allow both the government lessor
and the private operator to expend revenues for purposes other
than capital or operating costs of the airport.84 This exemption
79 49 U.S.C. § 47134(c) (2000); 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 29, at 5.
80 See generally Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 16.
81 SeeJulie Johnson, Big Players Circle Midway Eyeing Privatization, CHIcAGO Bus.,
May 26, 2006, available at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/print-
story.pl?newsid=20771. Those firms with interest identified in the story include
BAA (now privately owned by a consortium headed by infrastructure giant Grupo
Ferrovial) and Australia's Macquarie Infrastructure Group. Id.
82 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 3, at 3.
83 See Status of Airport Privatization Efforts: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation
of the Comm. on Transp. &Infrastructure, 106th Cong. 12 (1999) (statement of Rep.
Duncan, Member, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure) [hereinafter Status of
Privatization Efforts].
84 49 U.S.C. § 47134(b) (1) (A) & (b)(3) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004); see also 49
U.S.C. § 47133 (2000) (legislation prohibiting airports from diverting airport rev-
enues to non-airport purposes).
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eliminates the problematic prohibition on diverting revenue."'
The availability of this exemption was one of the key issues for
the State of New York in deciding to privatize Stewart Airport, as
there would have been no benefit in selling the airport if the
State could not do what it wanted with the money received from
the purchase. 6 In fact, in 1995, then-governor of New York
George Pataki pushed hard for the pilot program and the ability
to privatize airports, but the State's economic development
agency felt that the federal restrictions "which prevented an air-
port operator from taking revenue off the airport and realizing
the fruits of running a successful facility ... [were] particularly
onerous."87 Without the ability to use revenue for purposes
other than operating the airport or increasing the capital stock,
there would have been no reason for NEG to buy Stewart, or any
firm to lease Midway from the city of Chicago, as no money
would be made from the venture. In order to receive this ex-
emption, sixty-five percent of both the scheduled air carriers
and the total landed weight must approve the exemption before
the FAA can grant it.88 This section, combined with the require-
ment to maintain and improve the airport, allows airlines to re-
ceive some assurances that although airport revenues may now
be used for other purposes, capital development levels will re-
main adequate.
Similarly, the FAA may exempt the government lessor from
having to pay back the federal government for any grants or
land given from sources such as the Airport and Airway Im-
provement Fund or other federal money.8 9 This was another
major issue cited by the State of New York that, once able to be
exempted under the pilot program, allowed the State to pro-
ceed with the privatization of Stewart.90 Without this section of
the statute creating the pilot program, uncertainty would re-
main as to whether the federal grants would have to be paid
back and whether federal land would revert to the federal gov-
ernment; but with the ability to receive an exemption, such con-
85 See 49 U.S.C. § 47133 (2000).
86 Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 19 (statement of John E. But-
tarazzi, Senior Vice President of Empire State Development Corporation).
87 Id.
88 49 U.S.C. § 47134(b) (1) (A) (i) (Supp. IV 2004).
89 49 U.S.C. § 47134(b) (2) (2000).
90 Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 17-19 (statement of John E.
Buttarazzi, Senior Vice President of Empire State Development Corporation).
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cerns can be eliminated and resources can flow to their highest
value user.
C. COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND FOREIGN LAW
AND EXPERIENCE
Although foreign countries have a large head start in terms of
privatizing airports through either sales or long-term leases,
these other countries started from a much different place. The
main difference between the American and foreign experience
with privatization is that most other countries had a much
greater degree of public participation and control in running
the airport, as nearly every facet of the operation was controlled
by the government,. 91 This is in contrast to the current partici-
pation of private employees in the American government-oper-
ated airports.9 2 Many of these countries are privatizing their
airports in the midst of a large-scale move from a state-oriented
form of ownership to market-based incentives, and generally
have been "driven by a desire to raise capital, reduce the size of
the public sector, and to improve economic efficiency.93 How-
ever, airports in other countries are privatizing with fewer gov-
ernment incentives than currently exist under the pilot
program. For example, in Britain the state was reimbursed for
its past capital expenditures through the stock flotation of BAA,
which would not happen in the United States due to the exemp-
tion from paying back grants. 94 Further, BAA no longer receives
federal funding, while airports under the pilot program would
still be eligible for a great deal of federal aid in the form of
grants and subsidies.95
The current context for American privatization is much dif-
ferent, as there is a greater degree of private participation in
airport operation and financing. 96 It is currently estimated that
even at airports owned and operated by some level of govern-
91 See AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 5 ("In most other countries, the
national government owns and operates airports."); see also Status of Privatization
Efforts, supra note 83, at 58 (statement of David L. Bennett, Director, Office of
Airport Safety and Standards, Federal Aviation Administration) (stating that own-
ership by the national government is "probably the least efficient form of airport
ownership and operation").
92 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 26.
93 Id. at 29.
94 Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 33 (statement of Rep. Peter
DeFazio, Member, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure).
95 Id.
96 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 22.
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ment, over ninety percent of the employees are employed by
private companies, 97 such as Burger King or McDonald's, or pri-
vate janitorial services. Furthermore, as financial support from
the federal government has declined, a greater share of airport
financing has been acquired through private financial markets,
such that airport investment is already subject to some market
discipline.9" Finally, in order to receive grants, airports must be
operated in a way that will make the airport as self-sustaining as
possible (for example in their fee and rental structures), thereby
increasing the pressure for governments in the United States to
operate their airports as a private operator would.9 Since these
factors were not present at airports in foreign countries, foreign
countries had much more to gain through privatization in terms
of efficiency, increases in capital, and reduced costs, and thus
had a much greater incentive to turn the airport control and
operation over into private hands.'00
III. THEORETICAL ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND
OPPOSING THE PRIVATIZATION OF AIRPORTS
While privatization of airports is almost unheard of in the
United States and a relatively recent phenomenon worldwide,
there are still some generally accepted arguments supporting
and opposing the privatization of airports. These theoretical
propositions are largely based on the experience of the priva-
tization of other industries, as well as on the limited foreign ex-
perience with airport privatization. Proponents of privatization
generally advocate moving towards an enterprise view of air-
ports, in which the airports are no longer a provider of public
services, but instead are a vehicle for the acquisition of profits. 101
The opposing view is that these are public uses inclined to result
in a monopoly, and are therefore better left to the
government. 102
97 Id. at 26.
98 Id. at 22.
99 Id.
100 See generally id. at 32.
101 See generally POOLE, supra note 18.
102 See generally THE WORLD BANK, POVERT1Y REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGE-
MENT NETWORK, ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE 1990s: LEARNING FROM A DECADE OF
REFORM (2005); Joseph Stiglitz, An Airport's Debacle Worsened by Greed and Neglect,
FIN. TIMES U.K., Aug. 22, 2006, at 13.
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A. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION
Those in favor of airport privatization are generally people
who see government control of airports as a non-core function,
which can thus be better managed as a privately held business
subject to competition. 113 There are three main advantages
cited by the proponents of airport privatization: private control
of airports would lead to additional private capital to help fund
airport development; private operators would operate the air-
port more efficiently, thus improving service and lowering costs
for all involved parties; and finally, the sale or lease of the air-
port would augment government budgets, potentially reducing
the need for federal grants and taxes. 104
1. Airport Privatization Leads to Additional Development Capital
The first advantage cited by advocates of privatization is that
private control of airports will lead to additional capital devoted
to airport development. The first thing to note is that the
amount of air travel is currently growing0 5 and is projected to
continue growing.1 °6 This growth in the amount of air travel
can be contrasted with the continuing decline in funding from
Airport Improvement Program grants, which leads many observ-
ers to believe that this will cause a shortfall in airport develop-
ment funds. 10 7 Compounding this problem is the fact that
airport development money in the post-9/11 era is being spent
on increasing and upgrading security measures, which leaves
even less money to spend on increases in capacity and other
value-adding airport improvements.0 8
This problem of a lack of federal money is where private fi-
nancing comes in. Proponents claim that privately operated air-
ports could "potentially tap new sources of private capital-
including private equity-that airports will need to meet the
growing demand for capacity and facilities."' 09 BAA used pri-
103 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 2.
104 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 32.
105 PASSENGERS BOARDED, supra note 41 (total enplaned passengers rose 9.3%
from 2003-2004 and 30.5% from 1994-2004).
106 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 32.
107 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 16 (describing the "looming funding
shortfall in airport development costs"); AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at
32 ("Whether existing sources of capital will be adequate to meet future develop-
ment needs is uncertain.").
108 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 16.
109 Id.
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vate equity financing to launch the upgrades to London's
Heathrow Airport; BAA had a stock flotation, raised extra capi-
tal from private sources that saw the potential for growth, and
used that money to add value to consumers and return a profit
to the company."' Further, with private equity financing, there
are stockholders who expect a return; this creates further de-
mand for management who is expected to make risky invest-
ments in new capital, such as new terminals or innovative gate
leasing practices."' Because public entities cannot sell stock
and are largely not driven by an incentive to make profits, pro-
ponents of airport privatization claim that the ability to use non-
debt financing, such as stock offerings, will be critical to the fu-
ture success of airports, especially when the amount needing to
be financed is very large. 1 2
2. Airport Privatization Leads to Greater Efficiency in Airport
Operation
The second advantage to airport privatization is that the pri-
vate lessor will operate the airport more efficiently, thereby re-
ducing the overall cost to society. There are two parts to this
advantage-increasing the customer satisfaction and decreasing
the operating costs. Although one could argue that one or the
other of these measures of efficiency is more important, the abil-
ity of the private sector to decrease operating costs is more
quantifiable. For example, the Indianapolis Airport, which is
publicly owned but privately managed by BAA, has been able to
cut an enormous amount of cost out of the groundside opera-
tions of the airport by switching to private management." 3 In
fact, if BAA does not save the city of Indianapolis $140 million
over the ten year contract, BAA will not earn any profit.'14
Clearly the initial contract period benefited both parties, as BAA
continues to manage the Indianapolis Airport and the coopera-
tion between the two entities has consistently been hailed as a
success story for airport privatization in the United States. 1 5 As
li0 Id. at 13.
111 Robert W. Poole, Jr., Another Reason for Airport Privatization, THE FREEMAN:
IDEAS ON LIBERTY, June 2000, available at http://www.fee.org/publications/the-
freeman/article.asp?aid=2256.
112 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 33.
113 Asheesh Advani, Passenger-Friendly Airports: Another Reason for Airport Priva-
tization, in REASON POLICY STUDY No. 254, 2-3 (1999), available at http://
www.heartland.org/PolicyBotTopic.cfm?artTopic=310.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 2; see also Sander, supra note 13.
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further proof that this relationship is seen as a success, other
cities were quick to follow suit, engaging BAA and other foreign
companies with experience in managing airports to run the
commercial operations inside the airport. 1 6 One area of in-
creased revenue is the ability of privatized airports to think
outside the box; privatized airports are more likely to develop
malls or other shopping centers in and around the airport prop-
erty, as well as create new profit areas such as hotels.1" 7
While no economic studies have yet been done on the private
operation and management of American airports (because it is
a relatively new phenomenon), European airports have now
been privatized long enough to allow the performance of eco-
nomic analyses." 8 In a 2005 study comparing European private
airports to those owned and operated by a government entity,
private airports were found to operate at a significantly lower
cost per passenger or unit of cargo. 19 Further, it was found that
private airports have a higher revenue to expenditure ratio, and
the return on assets was much higher. 20 In order to show the
veracity of the results, statistics were run on the privatized air-
ports to see whether they performed better before or after priva-
tization, and eight out of the twelve significant indicators
pointed to post-privatization as the better result.' 2 1
While looking to see if privatization increases the return of
airlines and airport operators, it is also important to see how the
decision to privatize affects the users of the airport. Things like
efficient terminal design, amenities useful to the traveling pas-
senger, and quick check-in all contribute to the convenience or
inconvenience to a traveler, which, in the overall scheme, can
weigh heavily on the productivity of the economy. 22 If the trav-
eler is forced to wait at long lines for check-in or is forced to
walk long distances to gates, this adds to the price that he pays
for the ticket in lost opportunities; if airports can become more
responsive to passenger needs and wants by providing more de-
sirable services at the airport, the airport system will become
116 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 14.
117 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 8.
118 See VOGEL, supra note 12, at 2.
119 Id. at 11.
120 Id. The study found that the mean value of the return on assets of publicly
owned airports was 3.33%, while the privatized airports had a mean value of
5.50%, which is a 65% increase in return. See id. These statistics were significant
at a 99% level of confidence. Id.
121 Id. at 14.
122 Advani, supra note 113, at 4.
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more efficient. 123 One study found that privatized airports were
statistically more likely to be responsive to passengers than their
government-owned counterparts, meaning that privatized air-
ports generally did more to accommodate their passengers than
the government airports with which they were competing.
24
This advantage to privatization should not be overlooked, as the
government regulates airports to help the flying public, but if
the flying public could be better served by allowing private enti-
ties to run airports, it would be a disservice to continue the gov-
ernment ownership.
3. Airport Pivatization Can Benefit Local, State, and Federal
Budgets
As previously mentioned, under the pilot program, revenue
earned by the government owner through the sale or lease of an
airport may be exempted from the requirement that revenue
earned from airport operations cannot be diverted from airport
uses. 125 Because such a diversion of revenue is allowed under
the pilot program, there is now an incentive for the government
operator to sell or lease an interest in the airport.'26 Proceeds
received from privatization can potentially be enormous, as seen
when Australia's airports were recently leased for over $3 bil-
lion. 127 It has been predicted that the Midway privatization
would likely fetch a price greater than the $1.8 billion received
for selling the Chicago Skyway, and the price, based on recent
deals for other airports, could end up in the $2-$3 billion
range. 128 Adding such huge amounts to the budget seems like it
should be appealing to many local and state governments, which
are the main owners of airports in the United States. Such a
windfall could be put to use in a variety of ways, such as improv-
ing infrastructure in other parts of the state, servicing debt on
budget deficits, lowering taxes, or any number of other goals for
which the government lacked the funds.
Another advantage of privatization would be that if the priva-
tized airports were no longer eligible to receive federal grants,
subsidies, and tax exemptions, the budget position of the gov-
123 See id.
124 Id. at 11.
125 See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
126 See AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 34.
127 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 13.
12- Paul Merrion, Clouds Over Midway Deal, CHICAGO Bus., Jan. 29, 2007, availa-
ble at http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/ news.pl?id=23645.
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ernments would be augmented by increased revenues combined
with decreased expenditures. 129 By privatizing, there is already a
reduced dependence on grants and subsidies, and a rule that
would eliminate grant and subsidy aid to private airports would
aid in the budget position to a greater extent.3 0 Further, with
airports as public entities, cities, states and the federal govern-
ment are foregoing money that could be collected in taxes be-
cause the government property and revenues are tax-exempt.
For example, once an airport is privatized, the lessor will have to
pay income tax on the profits made, and would potentially have
to pay an additional property tax for the airport property, all of
which would make a potentially enormous contribution to
budget shortfalls.
B. ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSING AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION
There are three main arguments opposing airport privatiza-
tion: the risk of monopolistic abuse, loss of government control,
and over-sensitivity to economic factors." 1 Further, an emerg-
ing problem is that with the newly Democratic Congress, con-
cerns are being raised about the potential for foreign ownership
of airports. These factors, set against the benefits of privatiza-
tion, can often be fixed through an easy solution, but nonethe-
less merit attention in order to best accomplish the goals of
airport privatization.
1. The Prospect of Monopolistic Abuse
The main argument in opposition to airport privatization is
that while there can realistically be competition in air travel
among the airlines, most cities have only one commercial air-
port, and thus a natural monopoly frequently arises.13 2 The
main thrust of the argument on monopolistic behavior is that
airports will restrict quantity in order to set rates higher than the
efficient rate, and thereby reap monopolistic profits. Because of
this potential for airport ownership and control to result in mo-
nopolistic behavior, many commentators, even those generally
129 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 34.
130 See Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 14, 29, 33-44 (statements
of David Suomi, Vice President of BAA USA, and Representative Peter De Fazio,
Member, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure).
131 Soon-Kil Hong & Kwang Eui Yoo, A Study on Airport Privatization in Korea:
Policy and Legal Aspects of Corporatization and Localization over Airport Management,
66 J. AIR L. & COMM. 3, 8 (2000).
132 THE WORLD BANK, supra note 102, at 183.
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in favor of privatization, state that in most situations, such assets
"must be regulated or even operated by the public sector."'33
The question, therefore, is whether privatization of an airport
will result in a monopoly-type arrangement, and if so, what can
be done to remedy the situation.' Most commentators would
agree that in isolated cities with a single air carrier airport, the
privatization would most likely result in a monopoly; however,
most airline passengers are located in an area where they could
drive a distance of fifty to seventy-five miles to another airport if
the flight prices from the nearest airport were too high.'35 Fur-
ther, in cities such as Chicago, New York, Los Angeles, and
other large metropolitan areas, the people of the city have a
choice between two or more airports with commercial service.' 36
With two or more airports, it can hardly be argued that a single
privatized airport will exercise monopolistic power, as it will be
kept in check by the presumably lower prices at the nearby gov-
ernment-owned airport. Further, economic theory would sug-
gest that people with the best skills in managing and marketing,
which the airport should be seeking to hire, would seek employ-
ment where they can earn the highest wage, which is not usually
government employment. 137 Thus, while the private airports in
Europe would have access to the best employees, potential em-
ployees at American airports would have a greater incentive to
use their skills in another, more lucrative, career. 138 This result
means skilled workers will not be working at American airports,
thereby reducing the benefits to the American citizens engaged
in air travel.
Another argument relating to monopolistic behavior comes
from Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Prize winning economist and Clin-
ton appointee to the Council of Economic Advisors.3 9 He ar-
gued that, in the wake of the British terrorist plot to blow up an
aircraft in August of 2006, privately owned and operated air-
ports such as Heathrow fare worse in the aftermath of such a
crisis because there is little incentive to provide extra staff to
handle the increased security in the weeks after such an at-
133 Id.
134 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 16.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 See Hong & Yoo, supra note 131, at 4-6.
138 See id.
139 See Stiglitz, supra note 102, at 13.
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tack.140 Instead, he argues that the airports tell people to get to
the airport earlier, thus increasing the cost to those arriving
early by forcing them to wait in long lines and foregoing other
opportunities.'4 1 He argues that because Heathrow operates as
a monopoly, there is no incentive for them to change prac-
tices. 4 2 These arguments, however, do not apply to American
privatization. First, as mentioned, the FAA and TSA will still be
in charge of all security operations at a privatized commercial
airport.'43 Further, these types of long lines are present in the
United States when there is a terrorist situation, even when the
government is handling security. And finally, in the United
States, if there was a difference in security measures from Mid-
way to O'Hare, people would simply go to O'Hare, as it would
still remain under government control; unlike the London air-
ports which are all owned by BAA, there would presumably be
different ownership of the major cities' airports in the United
States.
If a monopoly did result, the government could always regu-
late the airport as it does with many other public utilities. This
was the response of the British government when they privatized
the London airports, where the British government used their
earlier experience in regulating the privatized British Telecom
and British Gas to regulate the potential monopoly of the newly
created and privately held BAA.144 In fact, if American airports
want to continue to receive federal grants, they must comply
with the FAA's definition of fair and reasonable pricing.'4 5
Other checks on the potential monopolistic practices of airports
include antitrust laws, such that if an airport were charging dis-
criminatory prices or engaged in other prohibited behavior, the
federal government could step in and prohibit these unwanted
practices. 14
2. Potential for Loss of Governmental Control
Another smaller concern is that because the government no
longer has direct day-to-day control, or perhaps no ownership




143 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2.
144 GOMEZ-IBA&EZ & MEYER, supra note 10, at 215-16.
145 POOLE, supra note 18, at 16.
146 Id.
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airport's actions. 147 No matter what type of privatization occurs,
the government will not lose as much control as advertised be-
cause they still have the power to regulate the airport in substan-
tial ways, such as putting a limit on fee charges, imposing safety
rules, and maintaining ultimate authority over other important
criteria such as noise or pollution. 4 8 For example, in the Mid-
way privatization, the FAA and TSA standards will continue to
apply, and all screening will still be performed by TSA person-
nel.' 49 Further, in a lease of an airport, the government will
hold the residual interest in the property, and therefore will
have rights commensurate with that position and the rights se-
cured by the contract with the private lessee.
Generally, the over-hyped loss of governmental control is not
a good reason to refuse to privatize, as the government still re-
tains a large degree of control, and many of the new incentives
created when the government loses control push in the direc-
tion the government would have regulated anyway. 5 ' For exam-
ple, although the government will no longer have direct control
over how much noise is emitted from the airport, it is in the best
interest of the private operator to be responsive to the commu-
nity about the amount of noise emanating from the airspace
and runway areas, all of which the government has no real in-
centive to pay attention to except for a few votes in the area
surrounding the airport. 151 As an example of this, Representa-
tive Edward A. Pease, a U.S. Congressman whose district abuts
but does not contain the Indianapolis Airport, stated that BAA
had done a wonderful job dealing with him and his constituents
regarding the noise from the Indianapolis Airport, leading him
to call that airport a "tremendously well managed facility. '" 152
Thus, although loss of governmental control may be disap-
pointing for the government because it no longer has the power
to control the airport's day-to-day operations, the loss of govern-
mental control should not be considered a legitimate barrier to
airport privatization.
147 Hong & Yoo, supra note 131, at 8.
148 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 15-17.
149 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2.
150 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 15-17.
151 Id. at 17.
152 Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 39 (statement of Rep. Edward
A. Pease, Member, H. Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure).
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3. Oversensitivity to Economic Factors
A potential problem arising from privatization is that the pri-
vate operator may become overly concerned with the share
price to the exclusion of other worthy goals. 153 This concern
with share price occurs in all corporations, however, so expres-
sing this doubt as a reason not to privatize calls into question
much of the American economy. In a related problem, airport
management may be seen as owing a duty to the public at large,
although the only way for the public to express their displeasure
is by voting with their wallets and finding alternative means of
travel. 154 While privatization cannot help but encounter these
problems, they are not nearly important enough to prevent the
benefits of privatization from accruing.
A potential solution to this problem is the continuation of
government involvement. When the airports of the UK were
privatized, they were still subject to regulations by the Civil Avia-
tion Authority (CAA) for safety and the airspace measures in the
same way that an American airport would still be subject to FAA
regulations. 5 In addition, the Monopolies and Merger Com-
mission (MMC) were involved to prevent any monopolistic be-
havior.'56 Further, the CAA and MMC "review the private
company's commercial policies as part of the five-year reviews
and could require changes."' 57 A private operator would also be
subject to the reporting requirements of the SEC, IRS, and
other financial watchdogs, so concern about the potential abuse
of monopolistic ability and the misalignment of corporate prof-
its and public good should fall short of erasing the benefits of
privatization.
4. Issues Relating to Foreign Ownership
As the privatization of Midway becomes more of a reality and
with the new Democratic majority in Congress, foreign control
of United States' infrastructure has again become a hot topic. 58
This concern arises because airports are seen as "critical trans-
portation assets in the post-Sept. 11 era,"159 and Democratic
153 Hong & Yoo, supra note 131, at 8.
154 Id.
155 GO6MEZ-IBA4EZ & MEYER, supra note 10, at 215-16.
156 Id. at 216.
157 Id.
158 See Merrion, supra note 128.
159 Id.
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leaders say that they think that there will be a similar reaction to
the Midway privatization as there was with the failed Dubai Ports
issue in 2006.160 Expressing concerns about the potential sale of
Midway to a foreign investment group, Representative Jerry Cos-
tello, the new chairman of the House Subcommittee on Avia-
tion, stated that privatizing "an airport is 'much different' from
a toll road," and that there "are security concerns unique to air-
ports.''161 This can be seen as a legitimate concern, but as men-
tioned before, the private operator will not be in charge of
security at the airport, as that will still be the province of the
TSA. 16 2 Further, this is not a good reason to block a lease, be-
cause there is no assurance that an American company will not
win the bid, as there will likely be a great deal of competition
between the many potential private operators.1 63 In fact, worry-
ing about foreign ownership will only serve to prevent American
entry into this lucrative market, as American firms will not be
able to outbid without some experience in the process.
IV. IS THE PRIVATIZATION OF MIDWAY A GOOD IDEA?
Of all the large American airports, Chicago's Midway Airport
has to be among the best choices for privatization. First, Chi-
cago's objectives for privatization are in line with the standard
practices as established by European airports, and thus the ex-
pectations of the government of Chicago are not unreasonable
for what is likely to occur. Further, Chicago already has experi-
ence in privatizing infrastructure, and thus is an excellent
choice to be the first large private airport in the United States to
privatize. Finally, when looking at the theoretical benefits and
problems with airport privatization, most of the prerequisites for
privatization exist while many of the largest concerns are
nonexistent.
A. MIDWAY'S OBJECTIVES ARE IN LINE WITH THE STANDARD
PRACTICES OF THE INDUSTRY
The objectives of the Midway privatization, as laid out in sec-
tion two of Chicago's Preliminary Application under the pilot
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
163 See generally Merrion, supra note 128. For example, Aecom Enterprises, a
Los Angeles-based consulting firm, is likely to bid on the Midway privatization.
Id.
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program,"' are consistent with the observed results of both the
European privatization efforts and the few American attempts at
privatization. The city divided its objectives into several key ar-
eas, including devising a new rate-setting methodology, increas-
ing operating efficiency, maintaining high safety and security
requirements, providing for future capital improvements, pro-
viding economic benefits to the city, protecting employees,
maintaining high noise and environmental standards, and en-
suring public use and competition.
165
As its first objective, Chicago stated that employing a new rate-
setting methodology in order to provide certainty and stability
for the airlines is a "key element. '' 166 The current rate is set by
the long-used residual cost method, 167 in which "the airport de-
ducts its commercial revenue (for example, lease payments from
shopping, car parking, and other concessions) from its total
costs and charges the airlines only the residual. 1 68 This residual
pricing system is inherently uncertain, as what the airlines pay in
fees is entirely dependent on the cost structure of the airport
and how much money it makes in a given period. 169 Chicago is
therefore looking to change the rate-setting mechanism in or-
der to provide certainty, which will help airlines operate more
efficiently and ensure that fees do not grow too quickly. 17 ' This
is similar to the experience of BAA; the fees charged by BAA
have only been able to increase at a rate less than that of infla-
tion. 1 71 Thus, in the experience of what is considered the best
example of privatization, airside charges have decreased in infla-
tion adjusted terms, providing the stability and cost savings fa-
vored by today's airlines. 172 This objective was deemed "key" by
Chicago because it is necessary to get the support of the airlines
to participate in the pilot program, and by showing that the city
164 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 1-4.
165 Id.
166 Id. § 2, at 1.
167 Id.
168 GOMEZ-IBA EZ & MEYER, supra note 10, at 228.
169 See PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 1.
170 Id. The airlines are now, in their weaker financial state, finally willing to
move to a more stable model for space rentals and landing fees. Robert W.
Poole,Jr., Will Midway Lease Re-Start U.S. Airport Privatization?, PUB. WORKS FINANC-
ING, Jan. 2007, available at http://www.reason.org/commentaries/poole200 7 01
00.shtml.
171 POOLE, supra note 18, at 11.
172 Id.
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and private operator are willing to cater to the airlines, it is
more likely that a deal can be accomplished.17 3
Other critical objectives of the privatization are increased op-
erating efficiency and increased customer satisfaction. 7 4 In
their stated objective, Midway will be able to operate more effi-
ciently "through the ability to leverage the 'best practices'
knowledge and expertise of the Private Operator.' 71 5 These op-
erators are companies such as BAA or Macquarie that have
worldwide experience in operating airports at the highest levels;
these companies have many different innovative solutions for
maximizing the profit of an airport, and thus can squeeze more
money out of the same infrastructure. 76 For example, BAA has
almost certainly increased the efficiency of the operation of
their British airports, as the flotation raised $2.5 billion when
sold in 1987, was valued at $4.5 billion in 1995,177 and was ac-
quired by takeover in 2006 for around $20 billion. 17s BAA must
have increased the efficiency and added innovative and creative
processes in order to increase the value to shareholders by ten
times over twenty years without increasing the real costs of the
fees airlines pay to the airport.
The City of Chicago, similar to other cities with privatized air-
ports, expects that the private operator will continue to improve
and modernize Midway airport. 179 Although Midway developed
new terminal space in 2004, Chicago has the legitimate expecta-
tion that a private operator would not only maintain the quality
of the space, but make additions to it in terms of design, incor-
porating new technologies, and generally improving the space
to conform to passengers' expectations.18 0 This is what BAA has
done at several of the airports that it owns or manages; for ex-
ample, in Pittsburgh, where BAA is the food and retail devel-
oper, it was responsible for working with the terminal space and
maximizing the potential inside the airport, where they have




177 AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION, supra note 2, at 30.
178 BAA Agrees to Ferrovial Takeover, BBC NEWS, June 6, 2006, available at http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/5050932.stm (the offer was valued at 10.3 billion
pounds).
179 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2.
180 See id.
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successfully created a first-class retail facility. 81 Similarly, BAA
aggressively developed its groundside business, bringing brand-
name retailers into the airport space and turning the terminals
of Heathrow and Gatwick into the equivalent of shopping malls,
which has drastically improved the performance of their air-
ports. 8 2 Thus, Chicago's expectation that there will be future
capital improvements is on target, as companies such as BAA
recognize that improving the airport is a strategy that will bene-
fit both the passengers and the company bottom line.
Finally, Chicago expects that throughout the privatization and
continuing into private operation, the private operator and the
city will work together to "ensure fair and equitable treatment of
all existing airport employees."'83 Chicago wants to ensure that
no collective bargaining agreement in effect when privatization
occurs will be abrogated.'84 This effort is in response to another
interested group, namely the employees, who are afraid that
they may lose their jobs or pensions because of the transfer.'8 5
However, in most of the airport privatizations, the private opera-
tor will simply convert the existing public employees to private
employees, although the now-private sector workers are subject
to the private rights of management including firing based on
performance, compensating employees, and determining the
work rules and conditions,186 all of which stand to enhance the
efficiency of the airport.
As previously seen, the expectations and objectives of the City
of Chicago are consistently in line with the observed results of
prior privatizations. Because the City is grounded what they
hope to achieve and in the standards to which they expect to
hold a private operator, the probability of success is much
higher in Chicago than in the case of a government that blindly
chases unattainable goals, as a private operator can take the
181 Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 45 (statement of David Suomi,
Vice President of BAA USA).
182 POOLE, supra note 18, at 11.
183 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2.
184 Id. § 2, at 2-3.
185 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 19.
186 Id. See also Status of Privatization Efforts, supra note 83, at 16 (statement of
David Suomi, Vice President of BAA USA) ("There is an established track record
that demonstrates the positive manner that employees are dealt with . . . . We
must let both the staff and the union leadership see that the private sector is not
a threat but rather, a way to become empowered, recognized, and properly
rewarded.").
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objectives at face value and calculate a reasonable price to pay
for a contract with the above mentioned characteristics.
B. CHICAGO HAS PRIOR INFRASTRUCTURE
PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE
Another major advantage that is working in favor of the Mid-
way privatization is the fact that Chicago already has considera-
ble experience as a lessor of transportation infrastructure. As
previously mentioned, in January 2005, Chicago became the first
city government to lease an existing toll road to a private entity
when it leased the Skyway to a Spanish consortium."8 7 This prior
experience creates two main benefits: decreased transactions
costs due to familiarity with the process and increased political
support because the population has seen that privatization
works through benefits provided to citizens.
The first major benefit of having already gone through a large
infrastructure privatization is that the city government has per-
sonnel that have already participated in such a project."'8 The
potential pitfalls of negotiating an extremely complex deal or
finding an investment bank to handle negotiations have already
been experienced, such that going through such a process again
will be simpler than starting from scratch.'8 9 Another benefit is
that the state government realizes what steps need to be taken to
provide the proper incentives and make it easier to lease the
airport. For example, when the Skyway was in the process of
being privatized, the Illinois legislature found that in order to
entice bidders, they needed to pass a bill that provided property
tax exemptions to the land on which the Skyway was situated. 0
Because the legislature already had experience with such priva-
tizations, it was able to pass a similar law applying a property tax
exemption to the land under Midway, thus enticing major inves-
tors to act even before the bidding officially starts. 1 ' These lit-
tle advantages, absent for most other cities, could prove pivotal
in establishing interest in the large-scale privatization in the
United States, and also a large windfall to the City of Chicago.
187 See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
188 See PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 1-2, § 6, at 4.
189 See id.
190 Gregory Meyer, Midway Privatization Bill Clears IL Senate, CHICAGO Bus., Mar.
3, 2006, available at http://chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/printStory.pl?news-id=
19723.
19, Johnson, supra note 81.
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C. THE BENEFITS OF PRIVATIZATION ARE PRESENT, WHILE THE
DISADVANTAGES ARE NOT PRESENT
The final reason why the privatization of Midway Airport
should take place is because all of the benefits of privatization
are present in this situation, while the concerns about privatiza-
tion do not hold water. Through privatization, Midway is likely
to receive more capital development, increase its operating effi-
ciency, and provide a financial boom to the city of Chicago.
Further, the privatization of Midway does not raise many of the
key concerns, as there is little prospect for monopolistic abuse,
the government will retain a large degree of control, and the
oversensitivity to economic conditions is not a great concern.
Midway will likely reap the benefits of additional development
capital for a number of reasons. First, history would predict this,
as nearly all privatized airports have received large capital infu-
sions; prior experiences at airports such as Heathrow (construc-
tion of new terminal) and Stewart (widening taxiways,
construction of maintenance facilities) illustrate that when pri-
vate operators take control of the airport, they strive to improve
their property. 92 Further, as stated above, any agreement with a
private operator will include the stipulation that the "Private
Operator will be required to maintain, improve and modernize
Midway Airport."'93 Specifically, "the City will obligate the Pri-
vate Operator to satisfy minimum capital investment require-
ments."'9 4 Thus, even if for some reason the private operator
does not want to take advantage of increasing its capital stock, it
will be mandated to do so by agreement with the City.
History also points to Midway becoming a more efficiently run
airport. As previously mentioned, both European and American
privatized airports have been able to reduce costs, which is a
large part of operating more efficiently. 9 5 Further, studies have
found that privatized airports are more responsive to customer
concerns.196 There is no reason that a major airport in the
United States would not exhibit the same increases in productiv-
ity, efficiency, and consumer responsiveness as major interna-
tional airports in cities such as London, Copenhagen, and
Melbourne have produced. Midway's main area of increased ef-
192 POOLE, supra note 18, at 11; 2004 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 29, at 10.
193 PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2.
194 Id.
195 See supra notes 113-21 and accompanying text.
16 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
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ficiency would likely come from the new rate-setting methodol-
ogy. Currently, Midway uses the residual method of
determining how much to charge airlines, leaving uncertainty
and risk for the airlines.'97 However, this can change to a fee
based on how much an aircraft uses the facility, relying on such
factors as runway time, what time the runway is being used, and
how much noise or pollution it produces.19 Pricing according
to the time it takes to land the aircraft and charging a premium
for landing times during peak periods leads to the efficient us-
age of the runways, which are a scarce resource. 9 9 BAA has
adopted these methods, which increases efficiency by guarantee-
ing that those who place the highest value on the runways get to
use them at certain times. 200 Midway, with its new rate-setting
methodology, can implement some of these same strategies,
while publicly owned airports might not have the flexibility or
vision to implement such policies.
If a lease of Midway Airport goes through, it will undoubtedly
provide an incredible cash infusion to a city budget sorely in
need of a lift. With the potential proceeds from a sale, money
would be allocated to continue financing other infrastructure
projects, as well as aiding in funding the city's pension system,
paying off some debt service, and retiring other debts.2 °' While
some may claim that the City could have made more money by
operating the airport itself for profit, there is little doubt that
receiving a lump-sum payment for the stream of profits a private
company can make will benefit the budget.
On the potential problem side, the oversensitivity to eco-
nomic fluctuations will probably occur.2 °2 However, there are a
few reasons why this should not limit the Midway privatization.
First, this is a characteristic of the American economic system;
all publicly held firms have the same incentives to provide con-
sistent returns to the stockholder, and thus to bring up this issue
in the context of privatization raises a critique of the entire
American economy. The oversight of entities such as the SEC
and IRS should limit the grossest exaggeration of profits or un-
derreporting of losses to the same extent as private utilities. Fur-
ther, the private operator of Midway will be under heavy
197 See supra notes 166-68 and accompanying text.
198 See GOMEZ-IBANEZ & MEYER, supra note 10, at 220-21.
199 Id. at 221.
200 Id.
201 See generally PRELIMINARY APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2.
202 See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
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government scrutiny, both by the City of Chicago, ensuring that
everything is working properly, and by the federal government
under the pilot program. Thus, any potential problem of over-
sensitivity to economic fluctuations is not of great concern for
the Midway privatization.
The loss of governmental control also should not be an issue
when considering the Midway privatization. Both the federal
government under the pilot program and the city government
of Chicago will be monitoring the behavior of the private opera-
tor, and will be able to step in if anything is amiss. Chicago will
be monitoring the capital investment requirements and ensur-
ing that the airport is available for public use, 20 3 while the fed-
eral government, FAA, and TSA will be monitoring such things
as noise, pollution, antitrust, and safety and security require-
ments. 20 4 Further, the FAA and Department of Transportation
will be monitoring the situation under the requirements of the
pilot program; under the statute, the Secretary of Transporta-
tion is required to report to Congress on the implementation of
the pilot program as applied to Midway, and may conduct audits
of the financial records of the airport operator.20 5 If, after per-
forming such an audit, the Secretary finds that the Midway oper-
ator is knowingly violating any of the terms of § 47134(c), he
may revoke the exemptions granted to the private operator.20 6
Because of all of these safeguards, it should be clear that al-
though the government cedes day-to-day control over airport
operations, the government still retains significant control over
the important matters on airport property.
Finally, the prospect of monopolistic abuse at Midway airport
is slight. First, Midway is neither the only commercial airport
nor the largest airport in Chicago. Because O'Hare will remain
the principal commercial airport in the region, there is almost
zero opportunity for Midway to price above cost, as carriers
could switch to operating out of O'Hare for point-to-point
flights out of Chicago.20 7 Further, although Southwest Airlines
is primarily a point-to-point airline, Midway can serve as an in-
formal hub for transcontinental flights; thus if Midway were to
increase prices, Southwest could move its quasi-hub activities to
another city in the central United States such as St. Louis, Den-
203 PRELIMINARv APPLICATION, supra note 3, § 2, at 2-3.
204 Id.
205 49 U.S.C. § 47134(k) & (1) (2000).
206 49 U.S.C. § 47134(i) (2000).
207 See POOLE, supra note 18, at 16.
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ver, or Minneapolis.2 °8 Finally, monopolization is not likely to
occur at Midway because the federal government will be keep-
ing a close eye on the project in order to ascertain if the pilot
program is working for a large airport, and thus the onus of
antitrust suits or federal investigations would weigh heavily in
preventing the private operator from engaging in monopolistic
behavior.
V. CONCLUSION
Chicago's Midway Airport is the perfect test subject for large
commercial airport privatization in the United States. Its poten-
tial to be profitable will lead to bidders experienced in operat-
ing private airports, there is little concern for monopolization,
there is room to increase efficiency, and would provide a city in
need with a cash infusion. One observer has stated that if Mid-
way becomes privately held, the United States could be poised
for an explosion of privatization of airport resources, as oc-
curred in the toll road market after the privatization of the Sky-
way.20 9 The United States has lagged behind the rest of the
world in airport privatization, best summarized by the comment
that "[t]he United States is a champion of private-sector partici-
pation in public services, from electricity to water to airports,
except when it comes to airports at home."21 With the priva-
tization of Midway Airport, the United States' aviation commu-
nity is departing on a course to catch up with the rest of the
world.
208 See GOMEZ-IBA&EZ & MEYER, supra note 10, at 226.
209 POOLE, supra note 18.
210 Gresham & Busey, supra note 14, at 12.
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